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It is well accepted that exchange rate policy in many emerging markets has been characterized by 
shifts between a stronger and weaker commitment to peg. This raises the following questions, 
which we address in our paper: Does intervention policy exhibit clearly defined and periodic shifts? 
What drives this policy variability? We identify clearly defined switches between high and low 
intervention in all the countries in our sample. We also find strong evidence that balance sheet 
effects, proxied by the stock ratio of external liabilities to assets, and economic performance, as 
measured by GDP and stock market indices, determine the likelihood of the regime shift. 
Specifically, an increase in reserve currency debt raises potential capital losses from devaluation 
and reduces the probability of switching to a low intervention regime. We use a panel of quarterly 
data starting 1985 through 2004 for a sample of 15 countries, mostly from East Asia and Latin 
America. We adopt a novel two-step empirical strategy in this paper. First, we measure the policy 
response of the central bank in two ways, both derived from the monetarist model: a standard 
exchange market pressure index and a model-based volatility ratio that is endogenized relative to 
Japan, our “benchmark” floater. We apply regime-switching methods to these “policy response 
indices.” This generates a time-series of unconditional probabilities of switching between high and 
low intervention. In the second step, we establish a set of variables that explains changes in these 
probabilities.  
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Policy makers’ in emerging markets have the usual objectives: high growth, low inflation, 
and a stable economic environment. Exchange rates have been used to anchor inflation in many of 
these countries. Equally commonly, these exchange rate based stabilizations tend to end in crises. 
The literature on exchange rate policy in small, open economies has in fact developed largely in 
the context of the currency and financial crises experienced by, among others, Mexico (1994-95), 
several East Asian economies (1997-98), Brazil (1999), and Argentina (2001). Several of these 
countries moved from crawling pegs to fixed regimes. In other cases, currency boards were 
followed by large devaluations, which in turn gave way to managed floats or “hard pegs.” 
In each of the above cases, the crisis occurred because continued compliance to the peg 
was too costly to be sustained given available policy instruments and resources. Various 
explanations have been brought forward for why commitment costs might be high: dwindling assets 
relative to liabilities in the central bank’s balance sheet (Dooley, 2000, Chang and Velasco, 1998 
and 1999; Cespedes et al., 2004), agent incentives when borrowing is cheap (Chinn and Kletzer, 
1999; Hausmann and Velasco, 2004, among others), the interaction between agents’ portfolio 
choices and anticipated exchange rate policy (Chang and Velasco, 2005), or all of the above.  
In addition, recent papers emphasize that reversals in the availability of external financing 
often precede crises. The crisis literature has of course long identified a fall in foreign lenders’ 
demand for domestic financial assets as the key characteristic of a crisis. The key role of private 
agents’ asset choices in influencing monetary and exchange rate policy is highlighted by the 
“sudden stops” phenomenon (Calvo, 1998). This term is used to capture the idea that when a fixed 
exchange rate regime is abandoned under crisis conditions, the decision to float is accompanied by 
a reversal of capital inflows, possibly even capital outflows. This leads to a fall in the current 
account deficit, which must be shrink as the external credit constraint tightens. In effect, the 
currency crisis coincides with a financial crisis. A disturbing implication is that sudden stops cause 
sharper recessions in afflicted countries relative to currency crisis episodes that are not 
accompanied by the withdrawal of external financing (Calvo and Reinhart, 1999).  
 It is also widely acknowledged that exchange rate policy in emerging markets has been 
characterized by shifts between a stronger and weaker commitment to peg, even though volatile 
policies may introduce costly uncertainty into the economic environment: welfare gains from 
eliminating policy uncertainty could be as high as 9 percent of trend consumption according to   3
Mendoza (1999). The model presented in Chang and Velasco (2005) provides a clue as to why 
there is policy variability in economies even when there are large potential gains from stabilization. 
In their model, domestic agents decide the currency composition of their borrowings given which 
the central bank determines exchange rate policy. The two decisions are made simultaneously: 
agents’ portfolio choices affect the exchange rate and the central bank takes as given the currency 
denomination of debt when setting policy. “Equilibrium” exchange rate policy thus depends on, and 
should vary with, the currency composition of the liabilities of the financial system and the private 
sector. 
The different strands of thought on failed exchange rate stabilizations may be brought 
together as follows. Policy makers in credit-constrained developing countries fix exchange rates in 
the hope that this will stabilize the economy and thereby stimulate capital flows and investment. 
The success or failure of this high intervention regime in achieving its objectives will rest on how 
credible the stabilization is to foreign investors, how well the growth rate picks up in response to 
capital inflows and to stabilization, how effectively debt is managed, and for how long improved 
economic performance is maintained. If the economy is unable to absorb capital inflows effectively 
the result is a wave of over-borrowing during the “boom,” which is self-destructive in nature since it 
creates the necessary and sufficient conditions for the “bust.” Intervention policy thus becomes 
endogenous to performance, which would help explain why, in many emerging markets, 
destabilizing policy switches have become a regular and debilitating occurrence.  
For this reason, our focus will be on the central bank’s policy response to over-borrowing 
(among other fundamentals). At this point we should clarify why the central bank need respond to 
foreign currency debt accumulation in the first place. The accumulation of reserve currency debt by 
the private sector and/or the poorly regulated financial sector becomes the central bank’s problem 
largely because the latter is the lender of last resort1. “Insurance” might be an additional 
mechanism through which the central bank becomes vulnerable to the economy-wide balance 
sheet. The central bank may provide explicit or implicit guarantees to foreign lenders (Dooley, 
2000) thereby forging a direct relationship between the overall increase in privately owed foreign 
debt and an increase in the central bank’s contingent liabilities.  
                                                 
1 The literature clearly recognizes this vulnerability of the central bank. The argument has even been made that a 
benefit of dollarization in such economies is that it eliminates the domestic central bank’s function of lender of last 
resort (Calvo, 2001).   4
How then would the central bank respond to growing dollarized liabilities? Reserve 
currency debt can affect the central bank’s exchange rate policy in offsetting ways. One would be 
by increasing the risk of debt default, causing capital inflows to slow or reverse. This puts pressure 
on central bank reserves and reduces resources available for intervention. A real shock that 
reduces growth rates could have the same effect: it is well documented that capital inflows are 
procyclical in developing countries (Kaminsky, 2004). Conversely, if the financial system has 
dollarized liabilities, there is an incentive for the central bank to avoid capital losses that would 
result if the home currency were to depreciate. This raises the benefits from continuing to intervene 
and engenders fear of floating (Calvo and Reinhart, 2002, Chang and Velasco, 2005). Once the 
costs of intervention outweigh the benefits, the central bank has no choice but to switch from high 
intervention to low intervention. In many of the countries in our sample, the shift to a floating regime 
occurs under crisis conditions or when capital flows are dwindling.  
To summarize, the growing consensus in the literature is that exchange rate policy 
emerges from the interaction between agents’ portfolio choices, the central bank’s role as lender of 
last resort, and flawed financial institutions.  This raises the issue of how central banks’ exchange 
rate policies respond to changing financial and economic circumstances, which we explore by 
addressing the following questions:  
•  Does intervention policy exhibit clearly defined cycles?  
•  What drives these policy cycles? 
Our empirical strategy is as follows. We first obtain an explicit policy reaction function for 
the central bank based on the monetarist model (Girton and Roper 1977; Weymark 1995; 
Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999). In the monetarist model, exchange market pressure is caused by 
money market disequilibrium and can therefore be relieved through direct intervention in currency 
markets. We measure intervention in two different ways, both of which we examine for regime 
switching behavior. This provides a robustness check.  
Policy choice, as reflected by the two measures of intervention, is modeled as an 
independent two-state Markov process: stabilization or high exchange market intervention and 
letting it slide or low exchange market intervention. The policy response of the central bank for a 
given increase in exchange market pressure is larger in the “high” intervention state than in the 
“low” intervention state. This generates a time series of the probabilities of switching from a high   5
intervention regime to a low intervention regime. Next, we identify a set of variables that explains 
regime switch.  
The explanatory variables capture potential “balance sheet effects” and include indicators 
of economic performance. The balance sheet indicators are the ratio of the stock of external 
liabilities to assets and the ratio of M0 to reserves. The size of reserve currency debt relative to 
assets can be thought of as capturing the extent to which the financial system is “leveraged” and is 
therefore a proxy both for risk of default and for the financial system’s exchange risk exposure. The 
ratio of M0 to foreign reserves, in the absence of capital controls, indicates the size of the central 
bank’s contingent liquid liabilities relative to assets. This is because all money in circulation is a 
liability of the central bank and, under a high intervention regime, the central bank must stand 
ready to swap domestic currency for reserve currency at the supported exchange rate. Economic 
performance is measured by GDP growth, stock market returns, and inflation differentials. We find 
that balance sheet effects are highly significant in explaining the switch from high to low exchange 
market intervention, even though the central bank faces offsetting incentives in this context. The 
results indicate that fear of floating does prevail, and high external liabilities relative to assets 
significantly increase the likelihood of remaining in the high intervention state, irrespective of which 
measure of intervention we use.  Our sample covers 15 countries, primarily from Latin America and 
East Asia2, over the period encompassing the first quarter of 1985 through the third quarter of 
2004.  
In the next section we motivate two measures of intervention and sketch the Markov 
switching model that we fit on these two measures. In Section 2 we discuss the results of the 
model outlined in Section 1 and present the probabilities that the central bank will switch away from 
a high intervention policy. In Section 3 we provide the underlying theoretical motivation for our 
empirical strategy, an overview of the data, the results of the regression analysis, and the 
estimates of the thresholds over which the regressors signal a policy switch. We conclude in 
Section 4 that financial and economic performance constrains the central bank’s decision to 
intervene.  
 
                                                 
2 The countries in our sample are: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Germany, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Thailand, and Venezuela. 
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Section 1: Intervention Indices and Switching 
 
Here we present a sketch of the monetarist policy reaction function, which is the basis for 
the two intervention measures used in this paper. These intervention measures are meant to 
capture the central bank’s ex poste reaction to exchange market pressure. The indices are then 
modeled as following independent, two-state Markov switching process.  
 
1.1 The Intervention Indices 
 
The basic assumptions underlying our specification of the intervention indices follow the 
standard for small, open economy models (Girton and Roper, 1977; Weymark, 1995; Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999).  
The model assumes that the level of foreign prices and the exchange rate both influence 
domestic prices, even if purchasing power parity does not hold. Foreign prices and foreign interest 
rates are exogenous, and foreign and domestic interest rates are linked through uncovered parity. 
Demand for domestic money is increasing in domestic output and decreasing in domestic interest 
rates. The exchange rate is in equilibrium when domestic asset markets are in equilibrium. A 
decrease in the demand for domestic money relative to supply causes the domestic currency to 
depreciate to its new equilibrium value such that the demand for domestic currency is equal to the 
supply.  
The central bank is responsible for exchange rate policy and may intervene in currency 
markets to support the value of domestic money at the desired level. This may involve changing 
domestic money supply unless intervention is sterilized, drawing down, or accumulating foreign 
reserves. Alternatively, given covered parity, the central bank may adjust interest rates to support 
the domestic currency.  The central bank’s intervention policy can be thought of in the following 
terms. If there is a change in the demand for domestic assets, the exchange rate is under 
“pressure” to adjust. If the exchange rate is not allowed to adjust to its new shadow value, the 
central bank must intervene or adjust interest rates to restore equilibrium (Frenkel and Aizenman 
(1982). The imbalance between domestic currency demand and supply is the wedge between 
actual and equilibrium exchange rates. This “exchange market pressure” or EMP can be relieved in   7
three ways: by allowing the exchange rate to adjust; by altering the interest rate; and/ or through 
direct intervention, i.e. the sale or purchase of reserve currency assets.  
If central banks use both changes in reserves and in interest rates as policy instruments, 
we can define EMP as in (1), which expresses EMP as a weighted average of changes in the 
exchange rate, interest rate, and reserves. In other words, if there is exchange market pressure, 
either the exchange rate or the policy instruments will have to adjust (Girton and Roper, 1977). 
Since exchange rates are more volatile than reserves (or interest rates), the elasticity 
int) /( Δ + Δ Δ − = r e η  is used to convert changes in the policy instrument into equivalent units of 
changes in the exchange rate (Weymark, 1995; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). The variables are 
as follows: e = exchange rate; r = foreign reserves; i = interest rate.   
 
) ( t t t t r i e EMP Δ − Δ + Δ = η          (1) 
 
As intervention implies that reserve changes occur in the opposite direction to changes in 
interest rates and exchange rates,  t r Δ enters the policy reaction function with a negative sign.  
Under conditions of disequilibrium in asset markets therefore, changes in the policy 
instruments can be used to help bring the supported exchange rate in line with the equilibrium or 
shadow exchange rate. Since the policy instruments change in response to EMP under a policy of 
intervention, we can write equation (2): 
 
EMP i r t t Δ − = Δ − Δ ρ           ( 2 )  
 
ρ  is the policy response parameter and indicates the extent to which disequilibrium is 
eliminated through changes in the instruments. When ρ  is zero, for example, the exchange rate is 
being allowed to float. In order to determine the extent to which the central bank is intervening, we 
consider the share of exchange market pressure that is being relieved through changes in the 
policy instruments or  t ω  . 
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We use the monetarist intuition to measure intervention in two ways. The first measure is 
simply the Weymark formulation contained in equation (3). In equation (4a), we rewrite this as a 
computable policy response index (PRI1it) by setting the weight η   as equal to ) / ( r e Δ Δ σ σ  
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1998).  
 
it it it r e
it it r e
it e i r
i r
PRI





) )( / (
) )( / ( 1
σ σ
σ σ
        ( 4 a )    
 
Since we are only interested in intervention, not in crisis dating, we do not have to impose 
any arbitrary thresholds on PRI1.  
The second measure follows from the relationship between policy instrument variability 
and exchange rate variability inferred by equations (2) and (3). If the exchange rate is pegged, or 
ρ  is equal to 1, the volatility of the exchange rate is zero. Reserves and interest rates will then 
adjust (in opposite directions) in response to exchange market pressure such that  t ω  equals 1 
also. If ρ = 0 and the exchange rate is allowed to float, the volatility of the policy instrument relative 
to the volatility of the exchange rate should be less than one or at the very least should be lower 
than it would be if the exchange rate was fixed. In equation (4b), this behavior is captured by PRI2, 
which is the ratio of the volatility of the policy instrument relative to exchange rates in country “i” 
divided by the same ratio for Japan, our benchmark floater. Both exchange rates are expressed in 
terms of the US dollar3. Again, we do not impose any thresholds on PRI2. Both measures therefore 





                                                 
3 We do not use the US dollar as our benchmark since the countries in our sample largely held the US dollar as 
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Each measure is modeled as following an independent two state Markov switching 
process, i.e.  
 




it ε σ μ φ μ      (5) 
 
 “S”, which indicates the intervention state, takes the values H (high) and L (low), such that 
the response in country “i” relative to country “j” is bigger in state “H” than in state “L” for a given 
level of EMP.  
 
1.2 Probability of Switching and Balance Sheet Indicators 
 
For each of the two measures, we specify that the probability of a switch in policy is 
conditional on the underlying financial and economic performance indicators. The state of policy 
response, high or low, is assumed to follow an ergodic first-order Markov process characterized by 
the matrix Π consisting of the transition probabilities “phl” from state H (high PRI) to L (low PRI) as 
in Hamilton (1989).  
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Following Kim and Nelson (1999), the unconditional probability of being in state L, based on the 
knowledge of the complete PRI series, can be calculated at each date, T.  
 




t hlT PRI PRI L S = = π         ( 7 )  
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These smoothed probabilities are reported in the next section, along with the filtered probabilities 
(over the complete time series). 
 




t hlt PRI PRI L S = = π         ( 8 )  
 
Equation 9 estimates the impact of a change in our economic and financial performance indicators 
on the likelihood of a policy response switch at each date: 
 
n T hlT Z a a − + = 2 1 π           ( 9 )  
 
Here Z is the set of explanatory variables, and n refers to the number of lags considered. 
We will estimate equation 8 in Section 2 with the objective of identifying policy switching between 
periods of high and low exchange rate intervention over the time period 1985 through 2004. This 
generates a time series of unconditional probabilities of switching to a low intervention regime. In 
Section 3, we estimate equation 9, and thus condition the regime shift probabilities on the set of 
country specific fundamentals in Z.  
 
Section 2: Identifying the Policy Cycles – Country Specific Markov Switching Models 
 
Regime-switching methods have been widely applied in both economics and finance ever 
since Hamilton’s (1989) study of business cycle dynamics. In particular, these techniques have 
been used to explain the forward bias in exchange rate forecasts and to improve out-of-sample 
forecasts of exchange rates (Engel and Hamilton, 1990; Kaminsky, 1993; Engel, 1994), to analyze 
the volatility of particular exchange rates (Bazdresch and Werner, 2005), to identify cycles in 
monetary policy preferences (Owyang and Ramey, 2004), and in tests of the switching properties 
of fundamentals in a monetarist exchange rate model (Frommel et al., 2005). The popularity of this 
approach relates to its greater power to distinguish across fluctuations between persistent regimes, 
whereas vector autoregression methods are, for example, appropriate only if shocks are transitory. 
We estimate country-specific Markov Switching autoregressive processes (Krolzig, 1997) 
with regime shifts in the mean of PRI1 and PRI2. As a robustness check, we opt to fit the regime-
switching model over quarterly data for PRI1 and over monthly data for PRI2.  As the variables in   11
the econometric analysis of section 3 are at quarterly frequency, PRI2 is transformed to quarterly 
frequency by taking period averages. All data are from the IMF (source and line numbers listed in 
the appendix), including debt and asset flows from which the stocks of external liabilities and 
assets have been cumulated (with the appropriate valuation adjustment4). 
We allow for regime-specific heteroskedastic errors and base model selection on the 
Schwarz statistics. Our results appear generally robust to lag length. We find regime switching in 
the mean for all 15 countries.5  The regime dates associated with both policy intervention indices 
are reported in Appendix 1.  For most countries, PRI1 and PRI2 identify similar regime switching 
points. Compared to PRI1, regimes based on PRI2 appear more persistent. In particular for the 
high-income countries in our sample (Australia, Germany, Japan and New Zealand), PRI1 
generates policy cycles of shorter duration and more frequent regime changes. The higher volatility 
of PRI1 is explained by the fact that the difference in the mean of high and low intervention states is 
much less pronounced and in the case of Japan only borderline significant.  Based on PRI1, regime 
classification is far more clear-cut if countries go through periods of high versus low intervention 
(developing countries) as compared to low versus some intervention (non-developing countries).  It 
is therefore not surprising that PRI2, scaled by Japan’s policy response index, is much less volatile 
for both developing and non-developing countries, as small fluctuations in the degree of 
intervention are filtered out. 
                                                 
4 See Kraay et al., 2000. 
5 Model specifications for country-specific MS-AR models are available from the authors upon request.   12
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Figure 1 depicts the regime probabilities based on PRI2 for Brazil over high (regime 1) and 
low (regime 2) exchange rate intervention periods. The identified regimes correspond closely to 
Brazil’s macro economic performance since the mid-1980s and suggest three episodes of floating 
(regime 2) for Brazil: the hyperinflation period following the failed 1986 Crucado Plan, the 
hyperinflationary period preceding the 1995 Real plan and a brief period following the 2002 
presidential election, when speculation about Brazil’s presidential succession generated a high 
degree of uncertainty about macroeconomic stability and pressure on Brazil’s currency.   
The Real plan successfully used the exchange rate as an anchor for price stabilization and 
the peg to the US dollar was abandoned in 1999. While we do not identify a regime switch to 
floating at the end of this fixed regime, we register a moderate increase in PRI2 relative to 1999.  
Indonesia (Figure 2) shows a clear regime switch to floating following the 1997 Asia crisis 
and Chile (Figure 3) exhibits a preference for floating since 2000. Appendix 2 contains the graphs 
for the full sample, along with the dates for the regime changes. The large swings in the German 
cycle towards the end of the sample are largely due to transfer of reserves to the European central 
bank.   13
Figure 2: Indonesia 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
2.5
5.0
7.5 Indonesia, 1985 (1) - 2004 (10)
CJP_IDN  Mean(CJP_IDN) 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0.5





1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
0.5
1.0 Probabilities of Regime 2
 
Figure 3: Chile 
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Section 3: Panel Regressions: Rationale and Results 
Theoretical Motivation 
 
Our econometric specification for the explanation of exchange rate policy cycles is 
motivated by the ideas formalized by the newer breed of financial and currency crisis models. 
These models form a growing and influential literature built around the idea that the sustainability of 
the exchange rate regime is largely determined by agents’ portfolio choices (Calvo and Reinhart 
1999, Chinn and Kletzer 1999, Dooley 2000, Calvo 2001, Manasse et al 2003, Cespedes et al 
2004, Hausman and Velasco 2004, Chang and Velasco 2005), the vulnerability of the central bank 
given its role as lender of last resort, and the moral failure generated by the monetary authorities’ 
support and imperfect financial sector, which further fuels the credit boom. The rationale 
underpinning these models is that an exchange rate policy can only be sustained as long as the 
costs of intervention do not exceed the benefits. This, as we have emphasized elsewhere in this 
paper, motivates us to model directly the central bank’s decision to intervene.  
  The theoretical basis of our econometric specification can be sketched as follows. 
Consider a small, credit constrained, and open economy. Purchasing power parity may or may not 
hold. Domestic and foreign interest rates are linked through the risk premium, which therefore 
determines the relative demand for domestic assets in a manner consistent with interest parity. 
There are four agents in this model. Foreign creditors lend, through domestic financial 
intermediaries, to domestic producers. Returns on domestic assets held by creditors, domestic and 
foreign, must be higher than that on foreign assets if capital inflows are to manifest. The central 
bank can help here by insuring foreign lenders and reducing exchange risk by committing to 
intervene if necessary. The peg is to the dollar, and the central bank will use its reserves to 
preserve equilibrium in the market for domestic currency assets. The cost of sustaining this policy 
will depend on availability of reserves, the extent to which capital inflows eliminate the need for 
intervention, and demand for domestic currency assets.  
There is an informational asymmetry between foreign lenders and domestic banks. 
Foreign lenders cannot observe the cost of financial regulation (or the domestic intermediaries’ 
incentive to screen domestic borrowers). They can however observe the insurance burden on the 
central bank.   15
Capital inflows generate both a monetary expansion and an increase in external debt 
relative to assets. Asset prices boom – typically those of land and stocks.  Domestic consumption 
is relatively cheap and the real exchange rate becomes overvalued. The informational asymmetry 
between foreign lenders and domestic banks reduces the latter’s incentive to evaluate domestic 
projects and results in over borrowing. A sufficient quantity of bad loans later, the economy slows 
down. Estimates of the cost of insurance are revised upwards as creditors’ expectations are 
revised to account for the likelihood that the central bank’s contingent liabilities become actual 
liabilities. Stock market indices start to slide, and stock market returns become more volatile. This 
leads to a higher risk premium on domestic assets. Since the available supply of external credit 
has a negative relationship with the risk premium, capital outflows or slowing capital inflows are the 
result (See appendix 4 for a confirmation that correlations between private capital inflows and other 
key variables are statistically significant). The appropriate policy response would be to raise 
domestic interest rates or to allow the domestic currency to depreciate once portfolios are 
reallocated away from domestic assets and the cost of intervention becomes too high. There is a 
real incentive to delay the switch to low intervention, however, even as the bubble bursts, the 
demand for domestic assets starts to fall, and pressure builds in the exchange market. Even 
though the cost of maintaining high intervention increases as the monetary base expands, capital 
inflows slow down, and the economy slides into recession, a higher share of external in total 
contingent liabilities increases the authorities exchange risk exposure. Devaluation would lead to 
potentially large capital losses therefore on reserve currency debt, which generates a fear of 
floating effect (Reinhart, 2000). Which effect dominates and how the economy’s balance sheet 
affects the central bank’s decision is a key component of our empirical analysis. We can therefore 
model the regime switch as being driven by the predictors in Table 1:   16
Table 1: Likely predictors 
Dependent Variable: Probability of switching to floating 
 
Control variables (Xit)    Relationship with Dependent Variable: Pr(floating) 
Stock of external liabilities/stock of 
external assets  
Negative; raises the cost of switching from fixed. 
GDP growth; growth in stock 
market indices 
Negative; negative growth is the result of the financial failure, which raises 
the cost of fixing. 
Real exchange rate6  Negative; cheap consumption fueled by the lending boom leads to an 
overvaluation of the real exchange rate. 
M0/reserves  Positive; easy money raises the cost of intervention. 
Volatility in stock market indices  Positive; uncertain returns further discourages capital inflows; the cost of 
intervention increases as external credit becomes less available. 
 
 




Before reporting the regression results, we present descriptive statistics for the control 
variables listed in Table 1 across different phases of the two regimes. Since exchange rate regime 
changes have often occurred in response to crises in emerging markets, we window out the four 
quarters leading to (pre-float) and following (post-float) the switch from fixed to floating. Table 2 
summarizes these descriptive statistics for the entire panel over the four sub-periods: fixed, pre-
float, post-float and float. Country-wise descriptive statistics are reported in the appendix.  
During the pre-float regime, debt to asset ratios, GDP, and ratio of M0 to total reserves all 
grow at a significantly higher rate than during the fixed regime. The real effective exchange rate 
index, stock market, and inflation variables do not appear to behave significantly different between 
fixed and pre-float periods. When comparing floating to fixed exchange rate regimes, we do not 
find any significant differences in GDP growth, debt to asset ratios, and real exchange rate 
dynamics. Inflation, growth in M0 relative to reserves, and stock market volatility are significantly 
higher in the floating regime than in the fixed exchange rate regime, as expected. 
                                                 
6 Results of stationarity tests performed on the transformed variables indicate that only the natural log of 
the real effective exchange rate index is marginally non-stationary (I(1)).   17
The differences that signal a change in intervention policy are not large, at least for the 
balance sheet indicator: if these numbers are interpreted as estimates of thresholds, there is only a 
122 per cent increase in liabilities relative to assets between pre and post floating on the one hand, 
and sustained fixed and floating on the other. Since external asset stock measures are cumulated 
from asset flows reported in the balance of payments, which are underestimates at best, the assets 
are largely central bank reserves. As these reserves fall, even a small increase in external debt can 
render intervention unsustainable. The output growth slow down is large however, across the same 
comparison points: around three per cent. The same is true for the ratio of M0 to reserves, which is 
a measure of the central bank’s contingent liabilities. The ability to sustain high intervention is 
associated with a fall in the growth of reserve money: the number jumps to twenty percent in the 
pre-floating phase. 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 

















relative to US 
inflation 
(1)  Fixed  0.48  0.04 0.53 0.00  -0.01  -0.03  -0.04 
(2) Pre-float  0.68  0.01  0.49  -0.01  0.20  -0.02  -0.01 
(3) Post-float  0.60  -0.07  0.59  0.02  0.22  0.02  0.00 
(4)  Float  0.40  0.05 0.67 0.00  0.26  0.02  0.05 
t-tests 
















(1)≠  (4)  p-value 
P>|t| 
0.3157  0.805 0.001 0.744 0.000  0.0061  0.007 
 
Panel Specification and Analysis: 
 
 For the entire panel, we model the probability of floating as being dependent on the 
control variables contained in Xit, (listed in Table 1). Equation 10 specifies that there are country 
fixed effects (captured by αi for the ith country).  
 
it it i it X floating ε β α + ′ + = ) ( ) P r (         ( 1 0 )  
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The results of the panel fixed effects regressions presented in Tables 5 and 6 are very 
similar even though the dependent variables are defined differently. Table 3 presents the results for 
the benchmarked volatility measure of intervention (PRI2), while Table 4 presents the results for 
PRI1. The latter measure is far more volatile, especially around crises points, but the econometric 
results do not show significant differences, even when the marginal effects are dissimilar.  
The ratio of external liabilities to assets is robust to changes in specification and across 
measures of intervention (PRI1 and PRI2) and always has a negative impact on the probability of 
floating. Balance sheet effects therefore clearly do matter, which is in line with our central idea that 
large potential capital losses on debt denominated in the reserve currency will push the central 
bank to intervene in order to avoid devaluation. The squared liabilities to assets ratio captures 
whether there is a change at a higher level of this ratio. While it is always negative, the squared 
ratio is significant only in specification (4), which also has the highest overall significance, and the 
highest adjusted R-square.  The threshold analysis reported in Table 2 suggests that while the 
“fear of floating” effect does delay the switch to low intervention, there is a significant increase in 
the debt to asset ratio during the sub-period classified as pre-floating. This could be because 
intervention is not sustainable at high levels of debt. The economic performance indicators also 
have the expected signs. Falling growth rates and stock market returns do appear to increase the 
cost of intervention. Higher stock market volatility has the same effect as slowing economic 
performance: it increases the probability of abandoning intervention and switching out of the fixed 
regime. This is most likely explained by the fact that stock market volatility captures returns 
uncertainty and an increasingly lower likelihood that capital inflows will be available to help support 
the fixed regime (correlations are reported in Appendix 4).  
Measures of volatility in the ratio of external liabilities to assets do not show up as 
significant. However the change in the ratio of M0 to total reserves captures growth in uncovered 
total contingent liabilities and is a positive predictor of the probability of floating. It reflects the 
growing insurance burden of the central bank and therefore is directly related to the rising cost of 
intervention needed to avoid a regime change.    19
Table 3: Dependent Variable is Intervention Index or PRI2 (Equation 4b): 
All variables in natural logs or 
log first differences 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) 
External liabilities to 
Assets (1 quarter lag)  
-0.162  -0.092  -0.267 -0.150 -0.062  -0.177 
 (5.21)**  (3.16)**  (5.64)**  (5.10)**  (2.35)*  (4.08)** 
External liabilities to 
Assets (1 quarter lag) squared 
-0.018 0.001    -0.031  -0.000   
 (1.47)  (0.10)    (2.64)**  (0.01)   
Volatility in stock market index 
(over previous four quarters) 
0.152 0.141 0.295       
 (2.66)**  (2.81)**  (3.85)**       
Change in GDP (over previous 
four quarters) 
-0.352  -0.535 -0.339   -0.545 
 (3.28)**    (3.88)**  (3.22)**    (3.84)** 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
Index 
-0.224  -0.117  -0.253 -0.310 -0.214  -0.354 
 (2.24)*  (1.20)  (1.81)  (3.17)**  (2.32)*  (2.64)** 
Change in ratio of M0 to total 
reserves (over previous four 
quarters) 
0.168  0.182  0.133 0.197 0.232  0.123 
 (2.82)**  (3.58)**  (1.62)  (3.44)**  (5.44)**  (1.45) 
Change in stock market index 
(over previous two quarters) 
 -0.028     -0.028  
   (3.22)**      (3.45)**   
Coefficient of variation in external 
liabilities to asset ratio (over 
previous four quarters) 
   -0.131     
     (0.87)       
Growth in the change in inflation 
difference over the US 
   0.050     0.131 
     (0.42)      (1.08) 
Volatility in change in external 
liabilities to asset ratio  (over 
previous four quarters) 
        -0.091 
          (1.78) 
Constant  1.417  0.891  1.428 1.901 1.405  2.096 
 (3.06)**  (1.96)  (2.19)*  (4.25)**  (3.30)**  (3.40)** 
Observations  641  690  284 704 715  311 
F-test for overall significance  13  14  11  13  14  11 
  0.11  0.09  0.24 0.10 0.09  0.17 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Marginal effects reported with z-
statistics in parentheses; Results of stationarity tests on transformed variables available from authors upon request. 
Natural log of Real Effective Exchange Rate Index is marginally I(1).      20
Table 4: Dependent Variable is Intervention Index or PRI1 (Equation 4a): 
All variables in natural logs or 
log first differences 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
External liabilities to 
Assets (1 quarter lag)  
-0.100 -0.091  -0.149  -0.089  -0.069  -0.090 
 (3.60)**  (3.57)**  (3.29)**  (3.38)**  (2.95)**  (2.18)* 
External liabilities to 
Assets (1 quarter lag) squared 
-0.048 -0.038    -0.059  -0.035   
 (4.46)**  (4.26)**    (5.74)**  (3.96)**   
Volatility in stock market index 
(over previous four quarters) 
0.161 0.087  0.264       
 (3.12)**  (1.92)  (3.46)**       
Change in GDP (over previous 
four quarters) 
-0.455   -0.397  -0.489    -0.463 
 (4.70)**    (2.88)**  (5.15)**    (3.38)** 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
Index 
-0.215 -0.124  -0.224  -0.236  -0.211  -0.247 
 (2.42)*  (1.44)  (1.67)  (2.72)**  (2.58)*  (1.96) 
Change in ratio of M0 to total 
reserves (over previous four 
quarters) 
0.077 0.242  0.168  0.115  0.249  0.160 
 (1.42)  (5.28)**  (2.05)*  (2.22)*  (6.47)**  (1.93) 
Change in stock market index 
(over previous two quarters) 
 -0.013      -0.015   
   (1.67)      (2.07)*   
Coefficient of variation in external 
liabilities to asset ratio (over 
previous four quarters) 
   0.187       
     (1.25)       
Growth in the change in inflation 
difference over the US 
   0.153     0.170 
     (1.48)      (1.63) 
Volatility in change in external 
liabilities to asset ratio  (over 
previous four quarters) 
        -0.056 
           (1.17) 
Constant 1.479  1.092  1.393  1.662  1.530  1.717 
 (3.60)**  (2.71)**  (2.21)*  (4.16)**  (4.04)**  (2.95)** 
Observations 696  733  313  759  758  343 
F-test for overall significance  <1%  <1%  <1%  <1%  <1%  <1% 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%; Marginal effects reported with z-
statistics in parentheses; Results of stationarity tests on transformed variables available from authors upon request. 
Natural log of Real Effective Exchange Rate Index is marginally I(1).     21
Section 4: Conclusion 
 
There is a growing body of evidence on the interaction between economy’s balance sheet 
and the sustainability of the exchange rate regime. This paper contributes to the literature by 
modeling the central bank’s intervention policy directly as a function of country-specific 
fundamentals that reflect such balance sheet effects. We adopt a novel empirical strategy in order 
to shed light on the key constraints on exchange rate policy. First, we measure intervention in two 
ways and model both measures as following independent Markov processes. This enables us to 
identify well defined switching behavior between high and low intervention regimes. Next, we 
condition the likelihood of the regime switch on a wide range of macroeconomic while controlling 
for country fixed effects. 
We find strong support for the thesis that financial responsibility determines the 
sustainable level of intervention across our sample of 15 Latin American and East Asian countries. 
This was found to be true not only around points of crisis. Boom-bust cycles less dramatic than 
those observed during crises are observed on a fairly regular basis for most of the countries in our 
sample, as evident from the graphs displayed in Section 2 and in Appendix 2.  
Our primary focus is to predict the likelihood of a change in the central bank’s policy choice 
conditional on rising external debt and contingent liabilities. We expect higher reserve currency 
debt constrains the central bank’s intervention policy  in at least two different ways. These two 
mechanisms work in opposing directions. For one, the burden of intervention is more difficult to 
sustain as the central bank’s uncovered contingent liabilities rise, given limited reserves and 
unreliable capital inflows. At the same time, devaluation implies capital losses on external debt and 
generates “fear of floating” (Reinhart, 2002).  Our econometric results indicate that the fear of 
floating effect dominates: the likelihood of moving from high to low intervention is significant and 
decreasing in the ratio of external liabilities to assets. However, as the threshold analysis in Section 
3 indicates, there is a large increase in the ratio of external liabilities to assets in the pre-floating 
period. This suggests that high reserve currency debt does reduce the central bank’s willingness 
and ability to intervene in currency markets. This constraint on the policy maker is tighter when 
capital inflows are dwindling or in a sudden stop situation (Calvo,1998). Interestingly enough, for 
most variables we found no significant difference in performance across fixed and floating regimes 
that are sustained (turning points are one year windows at both ends of the regime), though   22
expected inflation and stock market volatility are significantly higher under floating relative to fixed. 
The higher macroeconomic volatility under floating creates the desire to stabilize, which is typically 
the rationale for adopting the high intervention regime.  
These results are robust across alternative measures of intervention and changes in 
specification and are evidence that there are key constraints that drive the policy regime in a 
systematic way. High inflation creates the incentive to fix. Worsening debt, increasing contingent 
liabilities, rising stock market volatility, and declining rates of growth determine the likelihood of 
switching away from the fixed regime. We have made a contribution to the broader literature that 
seeks to clarify the constraints on central bankers and decision-makers in emerging markets.    23
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Appendix 1 
Regime dates for the full sample 
 PRI
2 (monthly data)  PRI
1 (quarterly data) 
  Fixed   Floating   Fixed   Floating  
Argentina  1993:2 - 2001:12 [0.9999]  1985:1 - 1993:1 [1.0000] 
2002:1 - 2004:10[1.0000] 
1985:3 - 1985:4 [0.9980] 
1991:3 - 1992:3 [0.9950] 
1993:1 - 1993:4 [0.9969] 
1994:3 - 2001:3 [0.9994] 
2004:1 - 2004:1 [0.5208] 
1985:1 - 1985:2 [1.0000] 
1986:1 - 1991:2 [1.0000] 
1992:4 - 1992:4 [1.0000] 
1994:1 - 1994:2 [1.0000] 
2001:4 - 2003:4 [1.0000] 
2004:2 - 2004:2 [1.0000] 
 
Australia  1985:7 - 1985:10 [0.9843] 
1990:5 - 1990:10 [0.9678] 
1994:6 - 1996:6 [0.9756] 
2000:10 - 2002:1 [0.9762] 
2002:10-2004:10 [0.9885] 
1985:1 - 1985:6 [0.9061] 
1985:11 - 1990:4[0.9858] 
1990:11 - 1994:5[0.9815] 
1996:7 - 2000:9 [0.9821] 
2002:2 - 2002:9 [0.9654] 
1985:3 - 1985:3 [1.0000] 
1986:1 - 1988:2 [0.9492] 
1988:4 - 1988:4 [0.9924] 
1989:2 - 1990:1 [0.9935] 
1990:4 - 1991:2 [0.9983] 
1991:4 - 1991:4 [0.9602] 
1992:2 - 1992:2 [0.8952] 
1992:4 - 1992:4 [0.8421] 
1993:3 - 1993:3 [1.0000] 
1995:1 - 1995:1 [0.9966] 
1995:3 - 1997:1 [0.9398] 
1997:4 - 1997:4 [0.9883] 
1999:1 - 1999:4 [0.9893] 
2000:4 - 2001:4 [0.9463] 
2002:2 - 2002:2 [1.0000] 
2003:1 - 2003:1 [0.8773] 
2004:2 - 2004:2 [1.0000] 
 
1985:1 - 1985:2 [0.7893] 
1985:4 - 1985:4 [0.6929] 
1988:3 - 1988:3 [0.9898] 
1989:1 - 1989:1 [0.5051] 
1990:2 - 1990:3 [0.9930] 
1991:3 - 1991:3 [0.9543] 
1992:1 - 1992:1 [0.5174] 
1992:3 - 1992:3 [0.9702] 
1993:1 - 1993:2 [0.9720] 
1993:4 - 1994:4 [0.9158] 
1995:2 - 1995:2 [0.9950] 
1997:2 - 1997:3 [0.9448] 
1998:1 - 1998:4 [0.9020] 
2000:1 - 2000:3 [0.8077] 
2002:1 - 2002:1 [0.5012] 
2002:3 - 2002:4 [0.8428] 
2003:2 - 2004:1 [0.9379] 
 
Brazil  1987:9 - 1992:1 [0.9972] 
1993:8 - 1996:2 [0.9929] 
2002:11 - 2003:7 [0.9825] 
1985:1 - 1987:8 [0.9850] 
1992:2 - 1993:7 [0.9664] 
1996:3 - 2002:10[0.9922] 
2003:8 - 2004:10[0.9641] 
1986:2 - 1986:4 [0.9021] 
1994:3 - 1998:3 [0.9642] 
1999:1 - 1999:1 [0.7019] 
1999:3 - 2000:2 [0.9795] 
2001:3 - 2001:3 [0.7495] 
2003:2 - 2003:4 [0.9858] 
 
1985:1 - 1986:1 [0.9999] 
1987:1 - 1994:2 [0.9899] 
1998:4 - 1998:4 [0.9816] 
1999:2 - 1999:2 [1.0000] 
2000:3 - 2001:2 [0.9909] 
2001:4 - 2003:1 [0.9710] 
2004:1 - 2004:2 [1.0000] 
 
Chile  1985:1 - 1985:5 [0.9778] 
1986:1 - 1987:7 [0.9841] 
1989:1 - 1994:3 [0.9955] 
1994:11 - 2000:2 [0.9920] 
 
 
1985:6 - 1985:12[0.8944] 
1987:8 - 1988:12[0.9523] 
1994:4 - 1994:10[0.8550] 
2000:3 - 2004:10[0.9918] 
1985:3 - 1985:4 [0.9690] 
1986:2 - 1987:1 [0.9290] 
1987:4 - 1989:2 [0.9102] 
1990:1 - 1990:2 [0.9806] 
1991:3 - 1991:3 [0.6312] 
1992:1 - 1992:1 [0.9851] 
1992:3 - 1992:3 [0.9270] 
1994:1 - 1994:4 [0.9278] 
1996:1 - 1997:2 [0.9896] 
1998:1 - 1998:3 [0.8825] 
1999:1 - 1999:1 [0.9956] 
2000:1 - 2000:1 [0.9468] 
2000:4 - 2000:4 [0.8708] 
2004:2 - 2004:2 [0.5828] 
 
1985:1 - 1985:2 [0.9362] 
1986:1 - 1986:1 [0.9994] 
1987:2 - 1987:3 [0.7515] 
1989:3 - 1989:4 [0.9975] 
1990:3 - 1991:2 [0.7152] 
1991:4 - 1991:4 [0.9822] 
1992:2 - 1992:2 [0.9896] 
1992:4 - 1993:4 [0.9620] 
1995:1 - 1995:4 [0.9200] 
1997:3 - 1997:4 [0.7751] 
1998:4 - 1998:4 [0.9767] 
1999:2 - 1999:4 [0.9968] 
2000:2 - 2000:3 [0.9709] 
2001:1 - 2004:1 [0.9460] 
 
Note: Numbers in square bracket are regime probabilities  26
Table A1 (continued): Regime dates for the full sample 
 
 PRI
2 (monthly data)  PRI
1 (quarterly data) 










1985:1 - 1988:4 [0.9813] 
1990:1 - 1993:12 [0.9846] 
1997:1 - 1999:9 [0.9787] 
2001:8 - 2002:10 [0.9577] 
1988:5 - 1989:12[0.9407] 
1994:1 - 1996:12[0.9942] 
1999:10 - 2001:7[0.9656] 
2002:11-2004:10[0.9971] 
1985:1 - 1985:1 [0.7466] 
1985:3 - 1985:4 [0.8305] 
1986:3 - 1986:3 [1.0000] 
1987:1 - 1987:1 [0.9869] 
1987:3 - 1987:3 [0.9970] 
1988:1 - 1988:2 [1.0000] 
1988:4 - 1989:3 [0.9191] 
1991:1 - 1991:2 [0.9999] 
1991:4 - 1992:1 [0.8683] 
1992:3 - 1992:3 [0.9995] 
1993:2 - 1993:3 [0.9138] 
1994:2 - 1995:3 [0.9205] 
1996:2 - 1997:1 [0.9967] 
1998:1 - 1998:2 [0.9940] 
1998:4 - 1998:4 [1.0000] 
1999:4 - 1999:4 [1.0000] 
2000:3 - 2000:3 [1.0000] 
2001:3 - 2001:4 [0.9795] 
2003:1 - 2003:3 [0.9819] 
2004:1 - 2004:2 [0.8890 
 
1985:2 - 1985:2 [0.8233] 
1986:1 - 1986:2 [0.8246] 
1986:4 - 1986:4 [0.7985] 
1987:2 - 1987:2 [0.8904] 
1987:4 - 1987:4 [0.8795] 
1988:3 - 1988:3 [0.8603] 
1989:4 - 1990:4 [0.8279] 
1991:3 - 1991:3 [0.8352] 
1992:2 - 1992:2 [0.6448] 
1992:4 - 1993:1 [0.7998] 
1993:4 - 1994:1 [0.8615] 
1995:4 - 1996:1 [0.8527] 
1997:2 - 1997:4 [0.8660] 
1998:3 - 1998:3 [0.5796] 
1999:1 - 1999:3 [0.7848] 
2000:1 - 2000:2 [0.6589] 
2000:4 - 2001:2 [0.7643] 
2002:1 - 2002:4 [0.8020] 
2003:4 - 2003:4 [0.7382] 
 
Germany  1985:1 - 1995:8 [0.9970] 
1996:10-2000:11 [0.9779] 
2001:5 - 2002:11 [0.9655] 
1995:9 - 1996:9 [0.9850] 
2000:12 - 2001:4[0.9882] 
2002:12-2004:10[0.9894] 
1986:3 - 1989:3 [0.9016] 
1990:4 - 1993:3 [0.9556] 
1994:3 - 1996:3 [0.8208] 
1985:1 - 1986:2 [0.8588] 
1989:4 - 1990:3 [0.8491] 
1993:4 - 1994:2 [0.5993] 
1996:4 - 1998:1 [0.8565] 
1999:1 - 2001:2 [0.9002] 
2002:4 - 2004:1 [0.8131] 
 
Indonesia  1985:1 - 1986:8 [0.9975] 
1988:9 - 1994:3 [0.9972] 
1995:6 - 1997:10 [0.9769] 
1986:9 - 1988:8 [1.0000] 
1994:4 - 1995:5 [0.9688] 
1997:11-2004:10[0.9945] 
1985:1 - 1986:1 [0.9928] 
1986:4 - 1993:3 [0.9927] 
1994:1 - 1997:1 [0.9959] 
2002:2 - 2002:3 [0.8955] 
2003:3 - 2003:4 [0.9597] 
 
1986:2 - 1986:3 [0.9999] 
1993:4 - 1993:4 [1.0000] 
1997:2 - 2002:1 [0.9794] 
2002:4 - 2003:2 [0.8464] 
2004:1 - 2004:2 [0.7716] 
 
India  1985:12 - 1987:1 [0.9687] 
1990:10-1995:12 [0.9824] 
1997:4 - 2000:8 [0.9896] 
2001:7 - 2004:10 [0.9866] 
1985:1 - 1985:11[0.9796] 
1987:2 - 1990:9 [0.9826] 
1996:1 - 1997:3 [0.9933] 
2000:9 - 2001:6 [0.9321] 
1991:3 - 1992:2 [0.9853] 
1993:2 - 1994:3 [0.9890] 
1995:1 - 1995:1 [0.6559] 
1996:3 - 1997:1 [0.9271] 
1998:4 - 1998:4 [0.7074] 
1999:3 - 1999:4 [0.7056 
 
1985:1 - 1991:2 [0.9921] 
1992:3 - 1993:1 [0.9998] 
1994:4 - 1994:4 [1.0000] 
1995:2 - 1996:2 [1.0000] 
1997:2 - 1998:3 [1.0000] 
1999:1 - 1999:2 [1.0000] 
2000:1 - 2004:2 [0.9955 
 
Note: Numbers in square bracket are regime probabilities   27
Table A1 (continued): Regime dates for the full sample 
 
 PRI
2 (monthly data)  PRI
1 (quarterly data) 
  Fixed   Floating   Fixed   Floating  
Japan      1986:4 - 1987:2 [0.8451] 
1987:4 - 1988:1 [0.7933] 
1989:1 - 1989:4 [0.9582] 
1990:4 - 1990:4 [0.6772] 
1991:2 - 1991:2 [0.8616] 
1992:3 - 1992:3 [0.9196] 
1993:2 - 1993:2 [0.6899] 
1993:4 - 1994:1 [0.8319] 
1994:3 - 1994:3 [0.9941] 
1995:4 - 1996:4 [0.7367] 
1998:4 - 1999:1 [0.8322] 
1999:4 - 2000:2 [0.9504] 
2001:2 - 2001:2 [0.8958] 
2003:1 - 2003:2 [0.9936] 
2003:4 - 2003:4 [0.9885] 
2004:2 - 2004:2 [0.9906] 
 
1985:1 - 1986:3 [0.8250] 
1987:3 - 1987:3 [0.7812] 
1988:2 - 1988:4 [0.8571] 
1990:1 - 1990:3 [0.9932] 
1991:1 - 1991:1 [0.6927] 
1991:3 - 1992:2 [0.9688] 
1992:4 - 1993:1 [0.7376] 
1993:3 - 1993:3 [0.9456] 
1994:2 - 1994:2 [0.7494] 
1994:4 - 1995:3 [0.8267] 
1997:1 - 1998:3 [0.8161] 
1999:2 - 1999:3 [0.7780] 
2000:3 - 2001:1 [0.8417] 
2001:3 - 2002:4 [0.9586] 
2003:3 - 2003:3 [0.8644] 















1985:1 - 1987:8 [0.9960] 
1988:5 - 1990:11 [0.9754] 
1991:6 - 1996:12 [0.9715] 
1998:10 - 2000:7 [0.9544] 
1987:9 - 1988:4 [0.9565] 
1990:12 - 1991:5[0.8360] 
1997:1 - 1998:9 [0.9632] 
2000:8 - 2004:10[0.9956] 
1985:1 - 1986:3 [0.9800] 
1987:4 - 1988:2 [0.9776] 
1988:4 - 1988:4 [0.6535] 
1989:2 - 1989:4 [0.9618] 
1990:2 - 1991:2 [0.9809] 
1992:2 - 1993:3 [0.8691] 
1994:1 - 1994:4 [0.9460] 
1995:2 - 1996:1 [0.9165] 
1996:3 - 1996:3 [0.6818] 
1997:1 - 1997:2 [0.9534] 
1999:1 - 2000:2 [0.9765] 
2001:3 - 2001:3 [0.8266] 
2003:1 - 2003:1 [0.7939] 
2003:3 - 2004:2 [0.9777] 
 
1986:4 - 1987:3 [0.9623] 
1988:3 - 1988:3 [0.9999] 
1989:1 - 1989:1 [0.7344] 
1990:1 - 1990:1 [0.9934] 
1991:3 - 1992:1 [0.9283] 
1993:4 - 1993:4 [0.9987] 
1995:1 - 1995:1 [0.9571] 
1996:2 - 1996:2 [0.9931] 
1996:4 - 1996:4 [1.0000] 
1997:3 - 1998:4 [0.9754] 
2000:3 - 2001:2 [0.9999] 
2001:4 - 2002:4 [0.9421] 
2003:2 - 2003:2 [0.6636] 
 
Mexico  1985:1 - 1985:7 [0.9652] 
1989:7 - 1994:12 [0.9925] 
1997:1 - 1999:6 [0.9738] 
2001:3 - 2002:10 [0.9873] 
1985:8 - 1989:6 [0.9969] 
1995:1 - 1996:12[0.9983] 
1999:7 - 2001:2 [0.9939] 
2002:11-2004:10[0.9960] 
1985:1 - 1987:4 [0.9990] 
1988:4 - 1989:1 [0.7359] 
1992:1 - 1992:1 [0.9317] 
1993:4 - 1994:2 [0.8463] 
1994:4 - 1994:4 [1.0000] 
1995:3 - 1996:1 [0.9156] 
1997:3 - 1999:3 [0.9863] 
2000:1 - 2001:2 [0.9126] 
2001:4 - 2004:2 [0.9369] 
 
1988:1 - 1988:3 [0.9233] 
1989:2 - 1991:4 [0.9404] 
1992:2 - 1993:3 [0.9887] 
1994:3 - 1994:3 [0.7145] 
1995:1 - 1995:2 [0.9223] 
1996:2 - 1997:2 [0.9625] 
1999:4 - 1999:4 [0.8061] 
2001:3 - 2001:3 [0.6187] 
 
Malaysia  1985:12 - 1987:3 [0.9463] 
1990:2 - 1995:1 [0.9820] 
2000:9 - 2004:10 [0.9994] 
1985:1 - 1985:11[0.9799] 
1987:4 - 1990:1 [0.9908] 
1995:2 - 2000:8 [0.9871] 
1998:4 - 2004:2 [0.9887]  1985:1 - 1998:3 [0.9993] 
Note: Numbers in square bracket are regime probabilities   28
Table A1 (continued): Regime dates for the full sample 
 
 PRI
2 (monthly data)  PRI
1 (quarterly data) 
  Fixed   Floating   Fixed   Floating  
New Zealand  1985:1 - 1987:12 [0.9942] 
1989:3 - 1994:6 [0.9930] 
1996:8 - 1998:12 [0.9807] 
2002:1 - 2002:7 [0.9020] 
1988:1 - 1989:2 [0.9381] 
1994:7 - 1996:7 [0.9681] 
1999:1 - 2001:12[0.9898] 
2002:8 - 2004:10[0.9864] 
1985:1 - 1985:1 [1.0000] 
1985:4 - 1985:4 [0.9882] 
1986:2 - 1986:3 [0.9994] 
1987:2 - 1988:4 [0.9095] 
1989:2 - 1989:4 [1.0000] 
1990:2 - 1992:4 [0.9909] 
1993:2 - 1994:3 [0.9254] 
1995:1 - 1997:1 [0.9505] 
1998:3 - 2000:1 [0.9168] 
2000:4 - 2000:4 [0.6318] 
2001:4 - 2001:4 [1.0000] 
2002:2 - 2002:3 [0.9910] 
2003:1 - 2004:2 [0.9585] 
 
1985:2 - 1985:3 [0.8013] 
1986:1 - 1986:1 [0.6634] 
1986:4 - 1987:1 [0.7880] 
1989:1 - 1989:1 [0.8925] 
1990:1 - 1990:1 [0.5151] 
1993:1 - 1993:1 [0.7945] 
1994:4 - 1994:4 [0.8737] 
1997:2 - 1998:2 [0.8922] 
2000:2 - 2000:3 [0.9664] 
2001:1 - 2001:3 [0.8782] 
2002:1 - 2002:1 [0.8813] 
2002:4 - 2002:4 [0.8973] 
 
Thailand  1986:3 - 1997:6 [0.9985]  1985:1 - 1986:2 [0.9743] 
1997:7 - 2004:10[1.0000] 
1985:1 - 1985:1 [0.8755] 
1985:3 - 1987:2 [0.9712] 
1987:4 - 1990:1 [0.9899] 
1990:4 - 1991:2 [0.9788] 
1991:4 - 1992:1 [0.9645] 
1992:3 - 1997:1 [0.9765] 
1998:4 - 1999:1 [0.9629] 
 
1985:2 - 1985:2 [1.0000] 
1987:3 - 1987:3 [0.7010] 
1990:2 - 1990:3 [0.9874] 
1991:3 - 1991:3 [0.9999] 
1992:2 - 1992:2 [0.9969] 
1997:2 - 1998:3 [1.0000] 
1999:2 - 2004:2 [0.9664] 
 
Venezuela  1985:1 - 1987:1 [0.9736] 
1988:11 - 1989:2 [0.9564] 
1990:11 - 1993:6 [0.9666] 
1997:3 - 2000:5 [0.9774] 
2001:3 - 2002:10 [0.9482] 
2004:1 - 2004:10 [0.8445] 
1987:2 - 1988:10[0.9812] 
1989:3 - 1990:10[0.9893] 
1993:7 - 1997:2 [0.9937] 
2000:6 - 2001:2 [0.9112] 
2002:11-2003:12[0.9685] 
1985:1 - 1986:2 [0.9910] 
1987:1 - 1988:3 [0.9886] 
1989:2 - 1989:2 [0.7395] 
1990:3 - 1990:3 [0.6974] 
1994:4 - 1995:2 [0.9770] 
1996:3 - 1997:4 [0.8577] 
1998:3 - 1998:4 [0.9299] 
2000:2 - 2001:2 [0.8947] 
2003:1 - 2003:3 [0.9590] 
2004:2 - 2004:2 [0.8974] 
 
1986:3 - 1986:4 [1.0000] 
1988:4 - 1989:1 [1.0000] 
1989:3 - 1990:2 [1.0000] 
1990:4 - 1994:3 [0.9953] 
1995:3 - 1996:2 [0.9655] 
1998:1 - 1998:2 [0.7924] 
1999:1 - 2000:1 [0.8531] 
2001:3 - 2002:4 [0.9935] 
2003:4 - 2004:1 [1.0000 
 
Note: Numbers in square bracket are regime probabilities   29
Appendix 2: Plot analysis for full sample 
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Appendix 3: Country-wise Descriptive Statistics 
 Argentina  Australia  Brazil  Chile  Colombia  Germany  Indonesia  India Korea  Malaysia  Mexico  New  Zealand  Thailand  Venezuela 
Debt/asset ratio 
fixed  0.62  3.52  1.25  2.51  2.5 0.74 5.24  6.19  3.02  2.68  0.85  3.21  2.18  1.41 
pre-float  0.70  2.94  4.64  3.47 1.64  0.9 4.03  4.82  2.04  2.07  1.11  2.37  2.25  1.47 
post-float  0.54  2.69  2.55  3.93 1.46 0.91 4.61  3.95  1.34  1.85  1.28  2.39  2.12  1.45 
float  6.91  2.53  2.49  1.77 1.24 0.81  2.2  9.26  0.44  3.27  1.37  2.15  1.49  2.09 
GDP growth 
fixed  0  0.03  -0.04  0.08  0 0.03 0.07  0.06  0.16  0.11  0.07  -0.04  0.11  0. 
pre-float  -0.96  -0.01  -0.03  0.07 -0.09 -0.01 -0.32  -0.01  0.05  -0.09  0.13  0.1  -0.45 -0.3 
post-float -0.08  0  -0.03  -0.02  -0.14 0.01 0.06  0.03  0.11  0.01  0.13  -0.05  0.02  -0.6 
float 0.17  0.13  0.08  0.03  0.06  -0.01  0.1  0.07  -0.05  0.03  -0.03  0.07  0.02  0.17 
Stock market volatility 
fixed  0.47  0.19  0.84 0.45    0.41  0.67 0.64 0.53  0.67 0.38  0.32  0.6  0.71 
pre-float  0.59  0.23  1.39  0.34 0.31 0.45 0.41  0.42  0.46  0.58  0.62  0.37  0.52  0.43 
post-float  1.1  0.16  2.35  0.26 0.51 0.44 0.58  0.37  0.52  0.6  0.49  0.3  0.93  0.37 
float  1.9  0.18  2  0.25 0.61 0.31 0.56  0.46  0.79  0.72  0.68  0.19  0.69  0.82 
REER change 
fixed 0.58  -0.22  -0.38  0.24  0.19  0  -0.02  -0.18  -0.15  -0.05  -0.02  -0.18  0  0.34 
pre-float  0.77  -0.12  -0.64  0.26  0.2 -0.12 -0.32  -0.23  -0.2  0  -0.02  -0.19  0.06  0.19 
post-float  -0.25 -0.1  -0.55  0.33  0.2 -0.08 -0.12  0.04  -0.13  0.32  0.17  -0.02  0.17  0.27 
float  -0.1  -0.12  -0.27  0.4  0.05 -0.02 -0.13  0.05  -0.26  -0.16  0.01  -0.13  -0.03  0.36 
Change in M0/reserves 
fixed  -0.04  0.02  0.41  0.03 0.01 0.02  -0.04  -0.12  -0.22  -0.1  -0.14  -0.03  -0.13  0.25 
pre-float  0.13  0.02  1.12  0.11  0.6 0.04 0.09  0  0.04  0.34  -0.04  -0.14  0.11  0.32 
post-float  0.85  -0.01  1.33  0.04  0.2 0.01 0.37  -0.08  -0.09  0.16  0.03  0.15  0.36  0.31 
float  1.11  -0.11  2.18  0.06 0.15 0.06 0.01  0.3  -0.19  0.33  0.02  0.02  0  0.26 
Change in Inflation Differential 
fixed  -0.11  0.00  0.06  -0.11  -0.08 0.13 0.06  -0.02  -0.1  0.01  -0.08  -0.01  -0.18  0.01 
pre-float  -0.01  0.01  0.15  0.13 -0.02  0 -0.02  0.01  -0.12  -0.18  -0.04  0.03  0  0.03 
post-float  0.08  0.01  0.2  0.12 -0.08 -0.02 -0.03  -0.12  -0.03  0.02  -0.07  0.00  -0.05  0.04 
float 0.15  -0.01  0.44  -0.05  0.1  -0.04  0.01  0.35  -0.01  0.03  -0.08  -0.00 -0.03  0.1   36




























Ln(capital  inflows)  1.0000             
Ln(external liabilities 
to assets) 
-0.2950  1.0000           
P-value  0.0000           
Ln(real effective 
exchange rate) 
0.0092  -0.1397  1.0000          
P-value  0.8083  0.0000         
Grwth. 
infl. diff. over US. 
(1 yr.) 
-0.1248 0.1192  -0.1663  1.0000          




0.0211 -0.0232  -0.0331  -0.1343  1.0000        





-0.1234  0.1095 -0.1522  0.5334  -0.1285  1.0000      





0.1869  -0.0403  0.1243 -0.2274  0.1532 -0.1716  1.0000    





-0.1056  0.1966  -0.1698 0.5569  -0.2156 0.6752 -0.2772    1.0000 
P-value  0.0061  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000   
 
Note: Bold indicates correlation of significant at less than 1%. Private capital inflows are highly correlated with key 
variables as outlined in the theoretical motivation. 
                                                 
7 Results of stationarity tests on transformed variables available from authors upon request. Natural log of Real 
Effective Exchange Rate Index is marginally I(1). 